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Abstract
This paper uses a dynamic eﬃciency-wage model to analyze the con-
sequences of immigration for a small country when there is discrimination
against immigrants in a dual labor market with unemployment. Discrimina-
tion is of the type “equal pay for equal work, but unequal work” which is
characteristic of economies with “guest-worker” systems. The model exhibits
three regimes for rising immigration levels. Immigration is most beneﬁcial for
natives in the intermediate regime. An analysis of regime switches shows that
changes attributable to “globalization” and technical progress are consistent
with growing opposition to immigration.
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Attitudes towards immigration are shaped, to a great extent, by its economic con-
sequences for residents of the host country. In the 1970s, it was often argued that
migrants do not compete with natives on the labor market as they are forced to hold
unattractive jobs. More recently, in a context of high and persistent unemployment
in Europe, the fear of increased unemployment is often invoked in public discussions
on immigration. Was the rise in unemployment responsible for the turn towards
more restrictive immigration policies in Europe, or are there other factors, such
as “globalization”, to be blamed? According to standard models of immigration,
unemployment seems to be the ideal culprit. Indeed, if the labor market is competi-
tive with full employment, immigration yields a surplus for the host country (Berry
and Soligo, 1969). By contrast, if unemployment occurs due to a minimum-income
guarantee, immigration increases unemployment and reduces the natives’ income
(Brecher and Choudhri, 1987, and Faini and Grether, 1997).
These approaches remain, however, unsatisfying not only with respect to their
explanation of unemployment, but also because they neglect the existence of covert
discrimination against immigrants. Indeed, it is often argued that immigrants and
natives do not have equal access to “good” jobs, especially in countries having
adopted a “guest-worker” system. This form of discrimination against immigrants
has been documented in many studies (e.g. Piore, 1979 and Hammar, 1985).1
The objective of this paper is to explore the welfare consequences of immigra-
tion in the context of a “representative” European labor market by using a dynamic
eﬃciency-wage model of a dual labor market in the tradition of Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), Bulow and Summers (1986) and Kimball (1994). In this model, unem-
ployment results from the assumption that primary-sector employers hire only the
unemployed, but not workers holding secondary-sector jobs. Instead of postulating
that native and foreign labor are imperfect substitutes, I assume in this paper that
migrants diﬀer from natives only by a positive probability of return to their home
country2; in all other respects, they are assumed to be identical to natives. As ﬁrms
1One consequence of this form of discrimination is the diﬀerent sectoral distribution of na-
tives and immigrants. Zimmermann (1994) documents this fact for the “guest-worker” countries
Germany and Switzerland where immigrants are heavily represented in construction and manu-
facturing. By contrast, the sectoral distribution of natives and immigrants are very similar in the
United States.
2The empirical evidence on return migration is discussed below in section 4. In guest-worker
countries, immigrants expect to remain a limited time in the host country because of the risk that
the work permit is not renewed. Other motives for return migration would include: life in the host
country turns out to be diﬀerent from expectations; the migrant’s family in the source country
1perceive the diﬀerence between the two groups, this leads to discriminatory hiring
behavior in an eﬃciency-wage model, because the incentive not to shirk depends
on the expected time-horizon of workers, and therefore on their return probability.3
Since competition ensures that ﬁrms do not pay diﬀerent wage rates to diﬀerent
groups of workers, discrimination against immigrants shows up as unequal access
to “good” jobs. In such a context, immigration aﬀects not only factor prices, as
in the neoclassical model of immigration, but also employment opportunities of na-
tives. One might expect immigration to reduce the share of natives working in the
secondary sector. On the other hand, native unemployment is also likely to increase.
It turns out that this eﬃciency-wage model, embedded in a standard Ricardo-
Viner model with sector-speciﬁc capital, provides a plausible representation of the
European policy stance towards immigrants. In particular, natives beneﬁt most from
immigration when there is sectoral segregation between immigrants and natives. The
critical level of the immigration stock at which maximum segregation occurs depends
on structural parameters and on the economic environment. The rising opposition
to immigration can be linked to a fall in this critical level, which is due in particular
to increased international integration, to technical progress in the primary sector
and, albeit to a smaller extent, to the rise in unemployment.
In an independent contribution which appeared while this paper was under re-
vision, Carter (1999) analyzes the role of (illegal) immigration in an eﬃciency-wage
model with dual labor markets. While they are close in spirit, there are important
diﬀerences between the two papers. Most importantly, the welfare analysis is car-
ried out below in a dynamic framework, whereas Carter (1999) compares aggregate
welfare indicators across steady states, neglecting the issue of transition. As will
become clear below, this is a source for bias, because the eﬃciency-wage model im-
plies that ﬁrms act as if they faced adjustment costs. Other authors have accounted
either for unemployment or for discrimination in the analysis of immigration, though
in a diﬀerent framework.4
experiences problems.
3The migrants’ probability of return has other consequences which are ignored here. See Galor
and Stark (1990, 1991) who discuss its impact on migrants’ savings decisions and work eﬀort.
4Ethier (1985) shows how the hiring of immigrants can insulate native workers from employ-
ment ﬂuctuations. There is discrimination against immigrants in the sense that only natives have
long-term, implicit labor contracts, whereas immigrants are hired freely at the current wage rate.
Schmidt et al. (1994) analyze the impact of immigration in the presence of trade unions in the
market for unskilled labor. Winter-Ebmer and Zweim¨ uller (1996) use an insider-outsider model
of wage bargaining to evaluate the impact of immigration on wages of young natives. By con-
trast to the present paper, they assume the existence of a two-tier wage system, where immigrants
(outsiders) receive lower wages than native workers (insiders).
2The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
dynamic eﬃciency-wage model of a dual labor market with unemployment and de-
rives the model’s regimes that appear with the presence of immigrants. Section 3
discusses the welfare consequences of immigration in each model regime within a
dynamic framework. In Section 4, the model is calibrated and its empirical impli-
cations are discussed. Section 5 examines the inﬂuence of increased unemployment,
globalization and technical progress on the attitudes towards immigration.
2 A model of dual labor markets and unemployment
Here, the distinctive characteristic of migrants is their probability of return migra-
tion to their home country; in all other respects, they are assumed to be identical to
natives. The return probability, θ, is assumed to be exogenous and constant through
time. Thus, the migrants’ expected time of stay in the host country is (1/θ).5 More-
over, at any instant of time, new immigrants arrive and replace those who leave,
such that the total stock of migrants remains constant (steady-state assumption).
The dual labor market is modeled in a dynamic eﬃciency-wage framework.6
Work conditions in the primary and the secondary sectors are not identical. The
primary sector oﬀers jobs with good working conditions, stable employment rela-
tionships and good chances for internal promotion. By assumption, workers in this
sector cannot be perfectly monitored. Thus, ﬁrms prefer to pay wages above market-
clearing levels in order to induce workers to supply eﬀort. As a consequence, jobs are
rationed in the primary sector and workers are queuing up for them. However, they
can always ﬁnd jobs in the secondary sector. These jobs are much less attractive
and consist in repetitive tasks that can be monitored without cost. The wage rate
is set competitively in this sector. Unemployment is introduced into the model by
assuming that primary-sector ﬁrms hire only unemployed workers.7 In this model
unemployment is involuntary in the sense that the unemployed would prefer to hold
primary-sector jobs. However, the unemployed can always ﬁnd jobs in the secondary
5Note that this simplifying assumption is a continuous-time version of the hypothesis adopted
by Galor and Stark (1990, 1991) in a discrete-time overlapping-generations framework.
6The basic structure of this model builds on Kimball (1994), who analyzed the dynamics of
the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) model. By contrast to Kimball, I assume the simultaneous existence
of a dual labor market and of unemployment, as proposed (in a static framework) by Bulow and
Summers (1986), Jones (1987) and Perrot and Zylberberg (1989).
7This formulation has been suggested by Bulow and Summers (1986) who argue that if there
are unobservable diﬀerences between workers (with respect to their quit rates, or their preferences
for primary-sector work), signaling considerations would lead primary-sector ﬁrms to hire only the
unemployed.
3sector.
Workers are assumed to be risk-neutral and to have identical instantaneous utility
functions, of the following form: u(c1,c 2,e)=µ(c1,c 2) − e,w h e r ec1 and c2 are
the consumption levels of the two traded goods, µ is a homothetic quasi-concave
function, and e denotes eﬀort. The variable e can take only two values: 0 if the
worker does not make an eﬀort (i.e. if he “shirks”), and e>0i fh ed o e sn o ts h i r k .





where π is a price index dual to µ, p1 and p2 are goods prices, w is the wage rate,
and yo is income from other sources (e.g. capital income). Workers are assumed to
maximize expected utility over their inﬁnite life horizon, using discount rate r.
The problem of a worker in the primary sector, who has to decide whether
to shirk or not, can be analyzed by relating the utility levels that he can attain
in the two cases. Let V s
1 (V n
1 ) denote the expected present value of utility of a
shirking (non-shirking) worker holding a primary-sector job. Likewise, V2 denotes
expected utility of a secondary-sector job, Vu the corresponding value if the worker
is unemployed, and V ∗ the (exogenous) utility of living in the home country (only
for migrants). To relate these situations, the asset-equation approach introduced
by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is followed. Following Kimball (1994), it is assumed
that primary-sector employment, and thus utility, change gradually (see section 3
for further discussion of this issue). A worker who shirks faces a probability d per
unit time of being discovered and ﬁred. Moreover, there is an exogenous probability
q per unit time for each primary-sector job to end; in that case the worker becomes
unemployed. The probability of leaving the country is Θ (where Θ = 0 for natives
and Θ = θ for migrants). If a worker has a job in the primary sector, he receives
wage w1 and expects a utility gain of ˙ V1 (where the dot designates a derivative with
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1 =( w1 + yo)/π(p1,p 2) − (q + d)(V
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8For simplicity, agents are assumed to consume their entire current income at each period. Thus
the inﬂuence of the return probability on the savings decision is neglected (on this issue, see Galor
and Stark, 1990).
4A worker in the primary-sector does not shirk if V n
1 ≥ V s
1 . At equilibrium, there
is no shirking and this condition holds with equality since there is no reason for a




1 − Vu)=e. (4)
The term on the left represents the cost of shirking, equal to the expected utility loss
of a shirker whose probability of being detected and ﬁred is equal to d.A w o r k e r
does not shirk if this cost is greater than the immediate beneﬁt of shirking, which
consists in avoiding any eﬀort.
If workers are unemployed, they receive unemployment compensation ¯ w and have
probability α per unit time of ﬁnding a primary-sector job (α will take diﬀerent
values for natives and migrants, as shown below), and probability α2 of ﬁnding a
secondary-sector job. For simplicity, I assume that unemployment compensation is
ﬁnanced by a non distortionary tax on capital income. For an unemployed worker,
the return is9:
rVu =
¯ w + yo
π(p1,p 2)
− e + α(V
n
1 − Vu)+α2 (V2 − Vu) − Θ(Vu − V
∗)+ ˙ Vu, (5)
If a worker holds a secondary-sector job, he is (by assumption) not able to ﬁnd a





− e − q2 (V2 − Vu) − Θ(V2 − V
∗)+ ˙ V2, (6)
where q2 is the exogenous probability of job breakup in the secondary sector.
Using (2) and (5), and noting that (4) implies ˙ V n
1 = ˙ Vu, the no-shirking condition
can also be expressed as:





(r +Θ+α + q). (7)
A worker only accepts a job in the secondary sector if V2 ≥ Vu. If this condition
is satisﬁed, it holds with equality because of competition among secondary-sector
9It is assumed here that the unemployed supply the same eﬀort as employed workers (e.g.
training programs, mandatory public work, job search eﬀorts). No qualitative result depends on
this assumption (which is adopted implicitly by Bulow and Summers, 1986). Indeed, the case where
the unemployed do not make any eﬀort can be obtained simply by assuming that unemployment
beneﬁts are given in real terms by ˜ w/π =(¯ w/π) − e, instead of ¯ w/π.
5ﬁrms. Using (5) and (6), this condition becomes:






The probability of moving from unemployment to a primary-sector job, α,c a n
be related to the variables of the model through ﬂow conditions. Because of the
probability of return migration, this probability diﬀers for the two population groups
Let a (a∗)d e n o t et h ev a l u eα takes for natives (migrants). For native workers, the
ﬂow out of the primary sector is qL1,w h e r eL1 is native employment in the primary
sector. Thus new hirings in the primary sector are qL1 + ˙ L1. These must be equal
to aU, the ﬂow out of unemployment, where U is native unemployment. A native
worker’s probability of ﬁnding a primary-sector job is therefore given by:
a =( qL1 + ˙ L1)/U. (9)
Taking into account the return probability, the analogous condition for migrants is:
a
∗ =[ ( q + θ)L
∗





1(U∗) is primary-sector employment (unemployment) of migrants.
Finally, the eﬃciency-wage model is embedded in a speciﬁc-factors (Ricardo-
Viner) model, often believed to be the privileged model to study the impact of
international trade or factor movements on income distribution. The sector-speciﬁc
factor is assumed to be capital. Labor is mobile between the two sectors, but
the primary sector oﬀers only “good” jobs, paying eﬃciency-wages w1,w h e r e a s
the secondary sector oﬀers only “bad” jobs, paying wages w2. Both sectors are
characterized by representative ﬁrms with constant returns to scale producing traded
goods. Following the small country assumption, relative prices of traded goods are
given. With proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms, and assuming that gross hiring never




L(Ki,L i + L
∗
i),i =1 ,2 (11)
where fi is the production function of sector i and fi
L denotes the partial derivative
of fi with respect to L. The equilibrium of the model is deﬁned by (un)employment
and wage trajectories which satisfy equations (7) to (11), where secondary-sector
employment of natives (migrants) is L2 = L − L1 − U (L∗
2 = L∗ − L∗
1 − U∗).
The capital stocks of both sectors are assumed to be entirely owned by natives. In
6the absence of ﬁnancial assets, agents consume their current income and thus trade
is balanced at any moment. A convenient choice for the num´ eraire is π(p1,p 2)=1 ,
implying that unemployment compensation, ¯ w,i sﬁ x e di nr e a lt e r m s .
Competition between ﬁrms in each sector ensures that ﬁrms do not pay diﬀerent
wage rates to diﬀerent groups of workers. As a consequence, natives and migrants
cannot both be simultaneously in the primary and secondary sectors, since equations
(7) and (8) cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously for natives (α = a, Θ = 0) and
migrants (α = a , Θ=θ). This can be seen by considering the following three
cases. First, if secondary-sector jobs are held by migrants and natives, equation (8)
implies a∗ = a. Then equations (7) cannot hold for both natives and migrants, since
θ>0. In this case, primary-sector ﬁrms prefer to hire only natives because the wage
level that prevents them from shirking is lower. Second, there is the possibility of
complete segregation where all natives work in the primary sector and all migrants
in the secondary sector. Third, primary-sector ﬁrms hire migrants alongside natives
if a∗ + θ = a. Then the condition θ>0 implies a>a ∗ and secondary-sector ﬁrms
hire only migrants (assuming there are enough migrants) since they would have to
oﬀer higher wages in order to attract natives. No other constellations than these
three are compatible with the constraints of the model.
An obvious question is whether the three cases indicate the existence of multiple
steady states. In the Appendix it is shown that these cases are mutually exclusive.
Thus they represent diﬀerent model regimes; for a given level of immigration, only
one regime applies. Indeed, rising immigration levels lead to the following steady-
state outcomes. Immigrants ﬁrst drive natives out of the secondary sector, then
spread from the secondary sector to the primary sector (and thus to unemployment).
The resulting model regimes can be described as follows (see also ﬁgure 1).
Regime I (immigrants in secondary sector). If only a small number of immi-
grants are present in the host country, the wage diﬀerential between the two sectors
is not suﬃcient to induce immigrants not to shirk. Thus primary-sector ﬁrms will
not hire them and, having no incentive to become unemployed, they all work in
the secondary sector. With increasing immigration levels native employment in the
secondary sector falls and ultimately the economy will reach a point where only
immigrants work in the secondary sector. This is due to the ﬁxed wage diﬀerential
between the two sectors.
Regime II (immigrants in secondary sector and natives in primary sector). In
this regime there is complete segregation between natives, all of whom work in the
primary sector or are unemployed, and immigrants who only work in the secondary
7sector. The wage diﬀerential is no longer ﬁxed and the immigrants’ (secondary-
sector) wage falls with immigration, because of decreasing marginal labor productiv-
ity, whereas the primary-sector wage remains constant, since natives are not aﬀected
by immigration.
Regime III (no natives in secondary sector). At a certain immigration level
primary-sector employers agree to hire immigrants because the wage diﬀerential is
suﬃciently large to prevent them from shirking. Therefore, in the third regime
immigrants work in both sectors (and are unemployed) whereas natives work only
in the primary sector and are unemployed.
It is now clear that migrants as a group suﬀer from sectoral segregation, despite
the fact that natives and migrants are equally productive. Moreover, segregation
results in discrimination, as the migrants’ average wage is lower than the natives’.
Note that in regimes I and III, wage rates in the primary and secondary sectors
are linked. Deducting equation (8) from (7) yields a ﬁxed wage diﬀerential between






(r + q +Θ ) , (12)
with Θ = 0 in the ﬁrst regime and Θ = θ in the third. In regime II, there is no such
relation.
3 Dynamics and welfare consequences of immigration
It is well known that in an eﬃciency-wage model, the equilibrium is ineﬃcient since
primary-sector employment is too low and unemployment too high (Bulow and Sum-
mers, 1986). While an employment subsidy in the primary sector would increase
national income, it would not necessarily be Pareto-improving (Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984) and is not generally adopted because of its inequitable nature. Hence it is
assumed that no such scheme is implemented at the initial equilibrium; there is thus
scope for immigration to have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the welfare of natives.10
However, the welfare impact depends on the adjustment path towards the new
steady state. As Kimball (1994) showed, the dynamic Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) model
has a multiplicity of equilibria. Which equilibrium (path) should be selected? Bulow
10Moreover, it is assumed that the “immigration surplus”, which appears because of the variation
of factor prices due to the ﬁxed supply of capital, cannot be redistributed from capital owners to
workers. Indeed, if the redistribution scheme is not discriminatory, i.e. if migrant workers are
entitled to the same beneﬁts as native workers, the surplus vanishes and immigration produces a
net loss (Razin and Sadka, 1995, and Wellisch and Walz, 1998).
8and Summers (1986) assume implicitly that employment variables jump instanta-
neously to their new steady states. The problem with this assumption is that it
is not robust with respect to the introduction of adjustment costs. Thus Kimball
(1994) argues that, among the multiplicity of equilibria, the one equilibrium where
(primary-sector) employment changes gradually can be singled out, because it rep-
resents the unique limit of a model with adjustment costs, as these adjustment costs
go to zero (Georges, 1994). In this section, this equilibrium path is derived for the
three regimes11 and its reaction to an exogenous arrival of immigrants is analyzed.
The result of this section can be summarized as follows (see also table 1). The
impact of immigration on native welfare is similar in regimes I and III, despite im-
portant diﬀerences in steady-state properties. In both regimes, the welfare of native
workers (owning no capital) falls with immigration as wages decrease, despite the
fact that native primary-sector employment increases with immigration in regime I,
but falls in regime III. By contrast, in regime II immigration has a positive eﬀect
on capital income without deteriorating the situation of native workers.
Regime I. Wage diﬀerentials are determined by the behavior of natives, as im-
migrants only hold secondary-sector jobs. Thus the ﬁrst regime can be described
by equations (7), (9), (11), and (12), with Θ = 0, α = a,a n dL∗
1 = U∗ =0 . T h e





(w1 − ¯ w) − (r + q)

U − qL1. (13)
This equation reﬂects the intuition that primary-sector ﬁrms delay the hiring of new
workers in an expansion (induced by immigration, for example) because of eﬃciency-
wage considerations: if all ﬁrms increased their hirings simultaneously, ﬁrms would
have to pay higher wages to induce their workers not to shirk.
A few manipulations are needed in order to express the right-hand side of (13)
as a sole function of L1.N o t e ﬁ r s t t h a t U = L − L1 − L2. Inverting (11) yields
L2 = g2(w2/p2) − L∗
2,w h e r eg2 denotes the inverse function of f2
L. Furthermore,
from (12), w2 = w1 − (e/d)(r + q), such that L2 = g2{[p1f1
L − (r + q)e/d]/p2}−L∗
2.
11Note that equations (2), (3), (5) and (6) were written assuming a continuous adjustment of
primary-sector employment.
9Since in this regime L∗
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Consider ﬁrst the steady state. Immigration “crowds out” native employment in
the secondary sector because immigrants are forced to work there. Thus immigration
increases primary-sector employment of natives, as can be seen by diﬀerentiating




























i)/wi is the elasticity of inverse labor demand in sector i, β1 is the elasticity
of w1 with respect to L1 in the no-shirking condition12,a n d∆ w =( w1/w2) − 1.
Through its impact on total labor supply, immigration pushes wage rates down:
dlogw1/dlog(L + L∗)=−1/Φ1 < 0. The intuition for these results can be gained
from the conventional speciﬁc-factors model without distortions, which can be ob-
tained as a special case of (15) by setting U =∆ w =0a n dβ1 →∞ .I n s u c h
a model, the elasticity of primary-sector employment with respect to an increase
in the labor force is, loosely speaking, equal to the ratio of the elasticity of labor
demand in the primary sector (in fact, 1/ε1
w) to the average labor demand elasticity
(λ1/ε1
w+λ2/ε2
w). Note that Φ1 is greater than the latter expression in absolute value,
because the increase in unemployment mitigates the employment and wage eﬀects
of immigration. Indeed, native unemployment increases proportionally even more
than primary-sector employment, ensuring that natives do not shirk in spite of the
fall in primary-sector wages.
Because of the change in composition of native employment, the average native
wage decreases less with immigration than sectoral wage rates; in some cases it
might even rise.13
The impact of diﬀerent policies on native welfare can be evaluated by con-
12In the deﬁnition of β1, L2 is assumed constant. The no-shirking condition (7) can be written
as w1 =( e/d)[r + q(L − L2)/(L − L1 − L2)] + ¯ w, such that β1 = eqL1(L − L2)/(U2w1d).
13From this steady-state property, one may be tempted to conclude (Carter, 1999) that in
regime I immigration could enhance the welfare of native workers. Such a result is, however, based
on the questionable assumption that the variables jump instantaneously to their new steady state
values.
10sidering the reaction of a primary-sector worker’s expected life-time utility to a
marginal increase in the stock of immigrants at time t0. Indeed, the natives’ indif-
ference between secondary-sector jobs and unemployment and equation (4) imply
that dVu =d V2 =d V1. The path of a primary-sector worker’s expected utility can







L + yo)+( e/d)(q + d). (16)
The dynamics of primary-sector employment and native welfare can be analyzed
in a phase diagram (ﬁgure 2), depicting equations (14) and (16). Immigration
shifts the ˙ L1 = 0 locus to the right without aﬀecting the ˙ V1 = 0 locus. Thus the
slope of the latter is decisive for the welfare impact of immigration: if it is positive
(negative), immigration has a beneﬁcial (detrimental) impact on the welfare of native
workers. This slope depends on the assumptions about the distribution of capital
among natives. I will consider the following two polar assumptions: (a) workers
do not own any capital (yo = 0) and owners of capital form a separate population




Under assumption (a), the slope of the ˙ V1 = 0 locus is unambiguously negative
since f1
LL < 0. It is clear from ﬁgure 2 that in this case native workers unambiguously
lose from immigration (and capital owners gain). Under assumption (b), the slope
of the ˙ V1 =0l o c u si se q u a lt o : 14
dV
n
1 /dL1 =( 1 /r)[d(w1 + yo)/dL1]=−(1/r)p1f
1
LL[(L
∗/L) − (U/L)] (17)
To put this result into perspective, recall that in a conventional speciﬁc-factors model
without distortions, d(w1 +yo)/dL1 = −p1f1
LL(L∗/L), reﬂecting the fact that in the
presence of L∗ immigrants at the initial equilibrium, additional (inﬁnitesimal) im-
migration leads to a redistribution of income from these immigrants towards native
capital owners, through the variation of factor prices. This is the mechanism that
underlies the Berry and Soligo (1969) result saying that ﬁnite immigration yields
an aggregate gain for natives. Thus a distinguishing feature of the eﬃciency-wage
model is the presence of the unemployment rate in equation (17). In the redistribu-
tion process induced by immigration, unemployment represents a “leak” since the










constant returns to scale: K1f1
KL = −L1f1
LL and K2f2
KL = −(L2 + L∗
2)f2
LL. Furthermore, dL2 +
dL∗
2 = g 
2(·)(p1/p2)f1
LLdL1, where g 
2(·)=( 1 /f2
LL). Thus: d(w1 + yo)/dL1 =( p1f1
LL/L)(L − L1 −
L2 − L∗
2), leading to (17).
11unemployed receive (by assumption) a share of the increased capital income. As
a consequence, the smaller the unemployment rate, the greater chances are that
additional immigration has a beneﬁcial impact on the welfare of natives.
Now turn to the dynamic adjustment process. Assume that the economy is
initially in a steady state (L0
1,V0
1 ). A sudden arrival of immigrants (instantaneous
increase in L∗) has the following immediate eﬀects. Primary-sector employment is
not aﬀected upon impact. Thus, (11) and (12) imply that in both sectors wage
rates do not move, and that total secondary-sector employment does not change
either. However, the welfare of native workers drops upon impact (see ﬁgure 2).
The new immigrants are hired immediately in the secondary sector, whereas an
identical number of native secondary-sector workers become unemployed. Indeed,
in contrast to migrants who have no chance of ﬁnding a primary-sector job, natives
are indiﬀerent between unemployment and secondary-sector jobs. According to (7),
the natives’ probability of ﬁnding a primary-sector job, a (or its inverse, the expected
duration of unemployment) is not aﬀected by immigration in the very short run, as
primary-sector ﬁrms immediately start to expand their demand for labor such that,
in equation (9), the rise in ˙ L1 oﬀsets exactly the increase in U.
Over time, employment expands in both sectors and wage rates fall in the pro-
cess. Unemployment decreases steadily towards a steady-state level which remains,
however, higher than the pre-immigration level.
Regime II. In this regime, immigration has no impact on the natives’ employment
situation and labor income, since there is no link between the secondary sector,
where all immigrants work, and the primary sector, where ﬁrms hire only natives.
In terms of the model equations, the only change from the ﬁrst regime is that
equation (12) is replaced by: L2 = 0. A sudden arrival of immigrants leads to an
immediate fall of the secondary-sector wage such that all new immigrants are hired
in that sector. Since there is complete segregation between natives and migrants,
the model “jumps” to the new steady state. Depending on the distribution of capital
income, native workers are either indiﬀerent (assumption (a)) or favorable towards
immigration (assumption (b)), since the reduction of secondary-sector wages implies
a rise in the return to capital in that sector. Moreover, the discounted sum of future
gains from capital income is greater than in the two other model regimes, because
factor prices adjust instantaneously.
12Regime III is attained when the diﬀerential between primary and secondary sec-
tor wages is suﬃciently large to incite immigrants not to shirk if they work in the
primary sector. As immigrants work in both sectors and are unemployed, the wage
diﬀerential is determined by their behavior. Formally, this regime is described by
equations (7) both for natives (Θ = 0, α = a) and for migrants (Θ = θ, α = a∗),
(9), (10), (11), (12) for migrants (Θ = θ), and L2 = 0. The no-shirking constraint
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Whereas in the ﬁrst regime immigrants “crowd out” natives in the secondary
sector, in the third regime a similar mechanism takes place in the primary sector.
A steady-state relationship between primary-sector employment of natives and mi-
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, 0 <C<1. (20)
To evaluate the impact of immigration on total primary-sector employment, diﬀer-
entiate (19) in the steady state. This yields: dL1/dL∗ = λ1/(Φ3|ε1


























Thus total primary-sector employment reacts similarly to immigration in regimes I
and III (note the similarity between Φ1 and Φ3)15, which is not surprising as the
wage diﬀerential is ﬁxed in both cases. By contrast to regime I, however, this result
15Φ3 converges towards Φ1 if L∗
1,U∗ → 0 and (U∗/L∗
1) → (U/L). In the model, however, there
is no smooth transition between regimes I and III since (U∗/L∗
1) is always greater than (U/L)b y
a ﬁnite amount.
13implies (together with (20)) that native primary-sector employment diminishes with
immigration. Moreover, this loss is not compensated by a fall in secondary-sector
employment, and native unemployment increases as wages fall. Are the welfare
eﬀects therefore diﬀerent in the two regimes?




1). Thus, native welfare depends only on the evolution of total primary-
sector employment, described by equation (19). It is striking that, with the exception
of the last term (which is small if L∗ is close to ¯ L∗, the immigration level delimiting
regimes II and III), this equation is equivalent to (13), with L1 playing the role of
L1. Therefore, the dynamic impact of immigration can be analyzed with the help
of a phase diagram analogous to ﬁgure 2, where the X-axis is re-labeled L1.
It appears now that regime III does not diﬀer qualitatively from regime I with
respect to the dynamic adjustment of welfare, despite the diﬀerences in steady-
state behavior. As in regime I, the welfare eﬀect of immigration depends on the
assumptions concerning the distribution of capital. Under assumption (a), the slope
of the ˙ V1 = 0 locus is negative. Under assumption (b), it is straightforward to
show that the slope is equal to the expression given in (17), where U is replaced by
(U + U∗). Thus, as in regime I, the welfare impact of immigration is more likely to
be beneﬁcial for natives if total unemployment is low.
The analysis of the dynamic adjustment process is more ambiguous than in
regime I, because the assumption of inﬁnitesimal adjustment costs is not suﬃcient
to guarantee a unique equilibrium path in regime III. Indeed, this assumption ensures
that total primary employment, L1, follows a unique adjustment path. The paths of
L1 and L∗
1 are, however, not uniquely determined, since a jump in one variable can
be exactly oﬀset by an (opposite) jump of the other. To single out one equilibrium,
it is necessary to assume that both L1 and L∗
1 change gradually. Then a sudden
arrival of migrants does not aﬀect wage rates “upon impact”. Thus, secondary-sector
employment (of migrants) is constant and the arrival of new immigrants increases
the migrants’ unemployment one-to-one. By contrast, native unemployment, U =
L−L1, remains unchanged initially since native (primary-sector) employment does
not adjust immediately. Over time, native employment falls and unemployment
increases progressively.
144 Calibrating the model
For policy discussion it matters not only whether immigration decreases wages and
increases unemployment, but by how much. Thus it is useful to calibrate the model
to check whether it is consistent with the empirical evidence. It is then possible to
evaluate quantitatively the welfare implications of immigration.
Empirical evidence on the probability of return, a central parameter of the model,
is scarce. Recent statistics on emigration, which are available in SOPEMI (1999)
for some European countries and Japan, indicate that return rates vary not only be-
tween countries, but also among diﬀerent groups of migrants.16 Return rates can be
approximated by the ratio of emigration by foreigners to their stock in the host coun-
try. In 1997, average return rates were higher in traditional guest-worker countries
(4.7% in Switzerland; 8.6% in Germany) than in other North European countries
(2.4–3.2% in Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden). Much higher values are attained for
particular national groups (the return rate for Polish migrants in Germany is 25%)
or for certain legal categories (the return rate for foreigners holding annual work per-
mits in Switzerland is 10%). It should be emphasized that most temporary migrants
are excluded from these statistics (such as workers holding short-term or seasonal
permits, and frontier workers). Moreover, there are other categories of migrants who
cannot expect to stay a long time in the host country. Immigrants entering illegally
take the risk of being discovered and expelled at any moment. Asylum seekers are
often granted the right to work upon arrival in the host country. Given the low
admission rates observed in recent years, their time horizon in the host country is
limited. Because of these statistical omissions, the probability of return migration,
θ, is set at 10% in the simulations, slightly higher than currently observed values.
The other parameters are chosen so as to describe a typical European economy,
such as France or Germany, around 1980. The consequences of recent structural
changes on the attitudes towards immigration are examined below. In the absence
of immigration, it is assumed that the secondary sector covers 10% of total employ-
ment17, the unemployment rate is 7%, and the average duration of unemployment
is 12 months.18 From these assumptions, it is possible to calibrate the ratio U/L1
16For the United States, see the survey by Lalonde and Topel (1997) who conclude that 30-40%
of immigrants eventually return to their home country. Evidence on subjective return intentions of
migrants is given by Dustmann (1993) for Germany. He reports that 55% of all immigrants intend
to return to their country of origin within the next ten years.
17Dickens and Lang (1985) estimate the share of secondary-sector employment (for males) at
12% of the labor force in the US.
18In 1982, the average duration of unemployment in France and Germany was 11.3 months
(OECD, 1983, table 25). In the late 1990s, it is still close to 12 months (OECD, 1999, chart 2.3).
15and, since the average unemployment duration is given by 1/a in the model, the
separation rate q = aU/L1. Furthermore, the annual detection rate d is assumed to
be 10%, the discount rate r is set to 5%. Sectoral production functions are Cobb-
Douglas, with a capital share of 0.3 in the primary sector and 0.25 in the secondary
sector. As the secondary-sector good is imported, its share in consumption (10% of
consumption expenditures) is higher than in production. The price index π(p1,p 2)
is derived from a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Following OECD (1994, chart 8.1),
unemployment compensation ¯ w is set to 30% of the wage in the secondary sector.
Consider ﬁrst the quantitative eﬀects of immigration on wages and unemploy-
ment. Most empirical studies ﬁnd that these two variables are rather insensitive to
immigration both in the United States and in Europe (Borjas, 1994; Zimmermann,
1994). In regimes I and III of the calibrated model, a 1% increase in the labor
force induced by immigration leads to a steady-state fall in wage rates of 0.3%.19
Because of the higher proportion of good jobs, the average native wage in regime I
is only reduced by 0.2%. These values are consistent with Borjas’ (1994) survey of
the literature, where he concludes that the elasticity of native wages with respect
to the number of immigrants is equal to -0.02 (p. 1698). Indeed, with immigrants
representing 8% of the US population in 1990, a 1% population increase through
immigration leads according to this estimate to a variation of -0.24% of native wages.
The steady-state unemployment rate is quite insensitive to immigration. Indeed,
a 1% increase in the labor force pushes the aggregate unemployment rate up by only
0.03 percentage points in regimes I and III. In regime II, additional immigration
has no impact on unemployment, and thus reduces the aggregate unemployment
rate by 0.05 percentage points. This leads to the surprising result that, compared
to the base situation (L∗ = 0) and at constant capital stocks, the unemployment
rate is only 0.05 percentage points higher if L∗ represents 14% of the native labor
force (corresponding to the switch between regimes II and III). Considering only
the situation of natives, it turns out that the natives’ unemployment rate increases
more with immigration in regime I than in regime III (+0.1 resp. +0.03 percentage
points), which is due to the diﬀerent reaction of L1 in the two regimes. Again, these
results seem to be in agreement with the empirical literature, where most studies
ﬁnd only a very weak (or no) eﬀect of immigration on unemployment.
Now turn to the welfare eﬀects of immigration. In relative terms, the equivalent
variation of native welfare can be measured by ∆V1(= ∆V2 =∆ Vu), divided by
19In regime II, the primary-sector wage (and thus the average native wage) is not aﬀected by
immigration, but the secondary-sector wage decreases by 2.5%.
16the discounted expenditure of an average native in the base situation.20 As the
convergence half-life is only 6–7 months in this model, the adjustment path does
not have much weight in the welfare indicator. Thus the intertemporal welfare
variations are quite well approximated by the steady-state eﬀects. It is clear from
(2) and (4) that for a native the steady-state welfare variation is given by: ∆V1 =
(1/r)(∆w1 +∆ yo). Together with the result that unemployment varies little with
immigration, this implies that in regimes I and III the impact of immigration on
native welfare is close to the eﬀect what would be obtained with a static competitive
model.21 As a result, regimes I and III hardly diﬀer with respect to the welfare
consequences of immigration. For a native worker who does not receive any capital
income, immigration leads to a welfare loss of 0.29% in both regimes. By contrast, if
capital income is distributed equally, the impact on welfare is close to zero (-0.01%
to -0.04%). Natives will clearly prefer regime II, where the welfare of an average
native rises by 0.18% with a 1% increase in labor force induced by immigration, and
native wages are not aﬀected.
The contrast between regimes I and III, on the one hand, and regime II, on the
other hand, is reinforced in an alternative version of the model with non-traded
goods. Indeed, it is often observed that many secondary-sector jobs are located in
the (non-traded) service sector (e.g. restaurants, personal services). In this variant
of the model, the relative price p1/p2 is endogenous. A general analytic treatment
of such a model turns out to be messy; thus only numerical simulation is performed.
With Cobb-Douglas production and utility functions, it turns out that the return to
capital in the two sectors is proportional.22 As a consequence of this property and of
the ﬁxed wage diﬀerential, relative goods prices are quasi constant in regimes I and
III and the eﬀects of immigration in these regimes are numerically almost identical
to the traded goods model. By contrast, in regime II immigration is beneﬁcial for
all natives, as it rises native wages and reduces unemployment. These eﬀects are
20A worker’s instantaneous cost (or expenditure) function is obtained by inversion of (1),





2,u 1) − c(p0
1,p 0
2,u 0)exp( −rt)]dt, where exponents 0 and 1 indicate the situation
before and after immigration. Since π is the num´ eraire, this simpliﬁes to ∆E = U1 − U0 =∆ V1.
A native’s total discounted expenditure in the base situation is U0 +(e/r). For an average native,
this amounts to (L1V1 + L1V1 + UVu)/L +( e/r).
21These results imply also that if aggregate native welfare is measured by L1V1 + L1V1 + UVu,
as in Carter (1999), it is not appropriate to use current employment weights.
22The return to capital in sector i is given by pifi
K.I fbi is the elasticity of output with respect
to capital in sector i and c the share of good 1 in workers’ expenditures, then
p1f1
K =( b1/K1)p1f1 =( b1/K1)[c/(1 − c)]p2f2 =( b1/K1)[c/(1 − c)](K2/b2)p2f2
K.
As capital stocks are sector-speciﬁc, returns are proportional.
17quantitatively signiﬁcant, since a 1% labor force increase through immigration leads
to a 0.6% rise in wages and in the welfare of natives, whether they own capital or
not.23
Thus one would expect natives to favor immigration if the economy is in regime
II, or if further immigration leads it there. Therefore, even if the economy is in
regime I, but with L∗ close to ˜ L∗, the immigration level delimiting regimes I and
II, additional immigration might be favored by a majority of natives. By contrast,
if the immigration stock L∗ is greater than ¯ L∗, the immigration level delimiting
regimes II and III, most natives are likely to oppose additional immigration.
There is an interesting parallelism between the eﬀect of immigration on native
welfare and the degree of wage discrimination, which can be measured by the dif-
ference between the average native wage and the average immigrant wage. To see
this, consider the relation between the level of immigration and the degree of dis-
crimination. With a ﬁxed wage diﬀerential in regime I, the fact that immigration
“pushes” natives from the secondary sector into the primary sector, while migrants
remain in the secondary sector, implies that wage discrimination increases. This is
also the case in regime II, due to the rising wage diﬀerential and complete segrega-
tion. The maximum of discrimination is reached at ¯ L∗, because beyond that level of
immigration, in regime III, migrants penetrate progressively into the primary sector,
reducing the gap between the average wages of both groups.
5 The eﬀects of changes in the economic environment
The turn towards restrictive immigration policies in Europe is often linked to the rise
in unemployment. In the model the welfare impact of immigration depends indeed
negatively on the unemployment level (see equation (17)). However, the quantitative
inﬂuence of the unemployment rate turns out to be rather limited. Indeed, rising
¯ w from 30% to 50% of the secondary-sector wage24 increases the unemployment
rate from 7.0% to 9.4%, which is close to the level attained in the 1990s in Europe.
However, the welfare impact of immigration is hardly modiﬁed; a 1% increase in the
23The underlying mechanism is the following. The expansion of secondary-sector output induced
by immigration leads to a fall in relative price p2/p1. This drives a wedge between the real
producer wage and the real consumer wage in the primary sector. The former decreases, leading to
an increase in native primary-sector employment and a fall in native unemployment, whereas the
latter increases, ensuring that natives do not shirk despite the lower unemployment. The burden of
immigration is entirely borne by “old” migrants, who see their wages fall by almost 10% (compared
to 2.5% if goods are traded).
24In France, for example, the average replacement rate increased from 23% of the wage in 1980
to 37% in 1991 (OECD, 1994, chart 8.1).
18labor force still leads to a loss in the average native’s welfare of -0.01%.
On a deeper level, the results of the preceding section suggest that regime shifts
(i.e. changes in ˜ L∗ and ¯ L∗) might have played an important role in the change of
attitude towards immigration. If the economy is initially in regime II (or in regime I
with L∗ close to ˜ L∗), certain shocks might shift the economy into regime III, leading
to a signiﬁcant change in attitudes towards additional immigration.
Three types of shocks are considered. First, an increase in unemployment com-
pensation (as above). Following Rodrik (1998), this can be interpreted as a conse-
quence of globalization since the increasing exposure to external risk has led govern-
ments of high-income countries to expand spending on social security and welfare.25
Second, another important aspect of globalization is increased import competition
from developing countries, which would be reﬂected in this model by a fall in the
relative price of secondary-sector goods. Third, technical progress has aﬀected labor
markets in important ways. It is not unreasonable to assume that productivity has
improved more in the primary than in the secondary sector.
It appears that ˜ L∗ and ¯ L∗ react similarly to changes in ¯ w, p2/p1 and productivity.





−1 {Cd¯ w +( 1− C)w1dξ1 − [(1 − C)w1(s2/s1)+w2](dp2/p2)}, (22)
where si =( ∂π/∂pi)(pi/π)i st h es h a r eo fg o o di in domestic expenditures, and ξ1
is a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter speciﬁc to the primary sector. All three
shocks tend to reduce ¯ L∗, for the following reasons. A rise in ¯ w produces an increase
in the unemployment rate and a fall in employment in both sectors. Therefore
natives leave the secondary sector, and immigrants start to penetrate the primary
sector, at lower immigration levels, which implies a reduction in ¯ L∗. A fall in the
relative price p2/p1 acts even more directly on the secondary sector by decreasing
its labor demand, thus reducing ¯ L∗. Finally, an increase in the primary sector’s
productivity has the same qualitative eﬀects as a decline in p2/p1.
Quantitatively, an increase in ¯ w seems to produce a smaller shift of ˜ L∗ and ¯ L∗
than the two other shocks (see table 2). Note that the 10% fall in p2/p1 corresponds
to the observed decline, between 1980 and 1990, of EU import prices (in import-
25In a one-sector dual labor market model taking demand uncertainty explicitly into account,
Saint-Paul (1996, chap. 4) shows that when demand becomes more volatile, primary-sector em-
ployment decreases and secondary-sector employment increases. This result seems to indicate that
if the dual labor market is internal to ﬁrms, ¯ L∗ might rise with external risk.
26¯ L∗ is determined (jointly with L1) by the equations: p1f1
L(K1,L 1)− ¯ w =( e/d)[r+qL/(L−L1)]
and p1f1
L(K1,L 1) − p2f2
L(K2, ¯ L∗)=( e/d)(r + q + θ). Diﬀerentiating these equations yields (22).
19competing sectors) relative to EU export prices (OECD, 1997, table 4.6).
The regime shift produced by these shocks is accompanied by a rise in wage in-
equality among identical workers (see ﬁgure 1). This characteristic is reminiscent of
the “fractal” quality of increased earnings dispersion: however narrowly one deﬁnes
groups, one still ﬁnds an increase in dispersion (Atkinson, 1997).
6 Conclusions
This paper has used an eﬃciency-wage model of a dual labor market with un-
employment to analyze the welfare consequences of immigration, assuming that
migrants diﬀer from natives only by their probability of return migration. As a
result, there is sectoral segregation, and thus discrimination against immigrants.
The model exhibits three regimes, depending on the level of the immigrant stock.
When calibrated, the model appears to be consistent with the weak sensitivity of
unemployment and wages with respect to immigration found in the literature. How-
ever, immigration turns out to be beneﬁcial for all natives only in the intermedi-
ate regime. Changes in the economic environment, in particular globalization and
technical progress, are found to lower the immigration level beyond which further
immigration has a negative eﬀect on the welfare of native workers. This might
provide an explanation of the rising opposition to immigration, complementing the
contributions on this issue by Razin and Sadka (1995) who use a model with endo-
geous human capital formation to show that the impact of immigration on native
welfare is negative in the presence of wage rigidity or with endogenous redistribution
policies. Similarly, Wellisch and Walz (1998) establish in a two-country model with
endogenous redistribution policy that social welfare is higher with free trade than
with free migration.
In a diﬀerent perspective, the model of this paper may also help to address
the puzzling questions raised by Blanchard and Katz’s (1992) empirical study of
regional labor market adjustment and by Card’s (1990) analysis of the “natural
experiment” of the Mariel boatlift. Referring to these two studies, Borjas (1994,
p. 1700) states this puzzle as follows: “Why should it be that many other regional
variations persist over time, but that the impact of immigration on native workers
is arbitraged away immediately?”. The arrival of the “Marielitos”, most of whom
had little education and did not have access to “good” jobs, can indeed be analyzed
in the present model as an instantaneous increase in the number of immigrants in
20the Miami labor market.27 With 20% of Miami’s population being of Cuban origin
in 1980, it seems reasonable to consider regimes II or III of the model. In regime
II, immigration has no impact on the wages and unemployment of natives, which is
consistent with Card’s (1990) observations. Even in regime III, the model predicts
that immigration has no instantaneous eﬀect on the situation of natives.
Thus the model suggests that if immigration has no impact on the native labor
market, this is not due to “arbitrage” by perfectly mobile workers, but can be
explained by the segmentation of labor markets and by the wage rigidity inherent to
the dynamic eﬃciency wage model. Moreover, if workers are imperfectly mobile, as
they probably are, the present model is also consistent with Blanchard and Katz’s
(1992) ﬁnding that adverse economic shocks may reduce regional wages for up to 10
years before they are reequilibrated by migration ﬂows.
27Even if the probability of return to Cuba could be considered as negligible, the Marielitos had,
at least initially, a high probability of leaving Miami since only 50% settled their permanently.
21Appendix
This appendixshows in three steps that the three model regimes do not deﬁne multiple
steady states for a given immigration level.
First, I demonstrate that regimes I and III do not deﬁne distinct steady states for given
L∗. To do this, I assume that the two regimes deﬁne distinct steady states for a given
immigration level, then show that this would imply strictly greater native population
in regime I, which is impossible. Indeed, total secondary-sector employment would be
greater than L∗ in regime I, whereas it would be smaller than L∗ in regime III. According
to equation (11) and because of decreasing marginal labor productivity, this implies that
w2(I) ≤ w2(III). From equations (8), (9) and (10) we then have:
qL1(I)/U(I) ≤ (q + θ)L∗
1(III)/U∗(III). (A.1)
Since θ>0 by assumption, a(I) <a ∗(III) + θ, and thus equation (7) implies w1(I) <
w1(III). Using (11) and decreasing marginal labor productivity yields
L1(I) >L 1(III)+L∗
1(III). (A.2)
As in the third regime natives and immigrants work in the primary sector, a∗(III) =
a(III)+θ<a (III). The latter inequality together with (A.1) imply L1(I)/U(I) <L 1(III)/U(III).
Considering also (A.2), it follows that
U(I) >U(III). (A.3)
Since L2(III) = 0, it is clear that L2(I) ≥ L2(III). Combining this inequality with (A.2)
and (A.3) yields L1(I)+L2(I)+U(I) >L 1(III)+L2(III)+U(III), which is impossible.
Second, I show that the regimes I and II do not deﬁne distinct equilibria for a given
immigration level, L∗. Proceeding as above, the fact that secondary-sector employment is
greater than L∗ in regime I, whereas it is equal to L∗ in regime II, implies w2(I) ≤ w2(II).
Moreover, natives do not work in the secondary sector in regime II as w2(II) − ¯ w<
(eπ/d)a(II). Combining this condition and (8) with the preceding inequality yields:
w2(I) = (eπ/d)a(I) + ¯ w ≤ w2(II) < (eπ/d)a(II) + ¯ w.
This implies, on the one hand, L1(I)/U(I) <L 1(II)/U(II) and, on the other hand, using
the non-shirking condition (7), w1(I) <w 1(II). From the two latter conditions, it is clear
that L1(I) >L 1(II) and U(I) >U(II). As above, since L2(II) = 0, this implies
L1(I) + L2(I) + U(I) >L 1(II) + L2(II) + U(II),
22which is impossible.
Third, I show that regimes II and III do not deﬁne distinct equilibria for a given
immigration level. Since secondary-sector employment is smaller than L∗ in regime III,
w2(II) ≤ w2(III). As immigrants do not work in the secondary sector in regime II, w1(II)−
w2(II) < (eπ/d)(r + q + θ), whereas this condition holds with equality in regime III.
Combining these (in)equalities yields:
w1(II) − (eπ/d)(r + q + θ) <w 2(II) ≤ w2(III) = w1(III)− (eπ/d)(r + q + θ).
Thus, w1(II) <w 1(III) which yields, together with decreasing marginal labor productivity:
L1(II) >L 1(III)+L∗
1(III). (A.4)
Moreover, w1(II) <w 1(III) and (7) imply U(II) >U(III). Together with (A.4) this yields
L1(II) + U(II) >L 1(III)+U(III), which is impossible.
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25Table 1: Qualitative eﬀects of immigrationa
Immigration level (L∗)b
Variable L∗ < ˜ L∗ ˜ L∗ ≤ L∗ ≤ ¯ L∗ L∗ > ¯ L∗
Regime I Regime II Regime III
t =0 t = ∞ t =0 t = ∞ t =0 t = ∞
Primary-sector wage (w1) 0–000–
Second.-sector wage (w2) 0–––0–
Natives
Primary employm. (L1) 0+000–







Unemployment rate (U∗) ++
aMarginal eﬀects upon impact (t = 0) and in the steady state (t = ∞). The sign
+ indicates that inﬁnitesimal immigration has a positive (– negative; 0 no) impact on
a variable. An empty ﬁeld indicates that the variable is zero in this regime.
b˜ L∗ and ¯ L∗ designate the immigration levels that delimit the three model regimes.
Table 2: Economic environment and model regimes (percentages)
Simulationa U/Lb ˜ L∗/L ¯ L∗/L
Base ( ¯ w =0 .3;p2 =1 ;ξ1 =0 ) 7.0 10.5 14.0
High unemployment ( ¯ w =0 .5;p2 =1 ;ξ1 =0 ) 9.4 10.1 13.4
Globalization ( ¯ w =0 .5;p2 =0 .9;ξ1 =0 ) 9.7 6.3 8.4
Technical progress ( ¯ w =0 .5;p2 =0 .9;ξ1 =0 .1) 9.0 5.2 6.7
a˜ L∗ and ¯ L∗ designate the immigration levels delimiting the three model regimes; ¯ w
is unemployment compensation, p2 the secondary-sector good price, ξ1 is an eﬃciency
parameter in the primary sector.
bUnemployment rate measured at L∗ =0 .
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✻ w1 − w2 =( e/d)(r + q)
wage rate
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Figure 1: Immigration level, wage rates and model regimes.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of adjustment to immigration (regime I)
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